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Essay 
Facts, Fictions and Other Artifices:             
“Constituent Authority” as the Work of Imagination 
ZORAN OKLOPCIC 
Increasingly preoccupied with the imaginative dimension of modern 
constitutionalism, contemporary theorists are still more inclined to treat the 
foundational ideals of modern constitutional government as the work of some 
abstract social imagination, rather than to turn their gaze inwards—and reflect on 
the ways in which their own creations contribute to those ideals’ survival. The aim 
of this Essay is to explore what might such, more self-reflective, and inevitably 
more meta-theoretical exercise entail, by paying attention to the tension that runs 
through Rick Kay’s seminal work on constituent authority—which in a certain 
sense illustrates the predicament of most constitutional scholars: torn between the 
imperatives of scholarly sobriety and patriotic loyalty—which makes them more 
inclined to rationalize the authority of established constitutional fictions—and 
their residual intellectual curiosity, which encourages them to foreground the 
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Facts, Fictions and Other Artifices:             
“Constituent Authority” as the Work of Imagination‡ 
ZORAN OKLOPCIC * 
INTRODUCTION 
The fiction that replaced the divine right of kings is our 
fiction, and it accordingly seems less fictional to us. Only the 
cynical among us will scoff at Lincoln’s dedication to 
“government of the people, by the people, and for the 
people.” Sober thought may tell us that . . . [no government] 
can literally be by the people. But sober thought will also tell 
us that the sovereignty of the people, however fictional, has 
worked.1  
[T]raditional authority is based on what we could call the 
mystique of the Institution . . . . [W]e know that Authority is a 
fiction, but nevertheless this fiction regulates our actual, real 
behaviour; we regulate social reality itself as though the 
fiction were real. But the cynic . . . does not really accept its 
symbolic efficacy, he merely uses it as means of 
manipulation. The efficacy of the fiction takes its revenge on 
him when a coincidence of the fiction with reality occurs: he 
then performs as “his own sucker.” . . . The totalitarian, too, 
does not believe in the symbolic fiction . . . he knows very 
well that the Emperor is naked. . . . Yet in contrast to 
traditional authority, what he adds is not “but nevertheless” 
but “just because”: just because the Emperor is naked we 
must hold together the more, work for the Good, our Cause is 
all the more necessary.2 
                                                                                                                     
‡ For Rick Kay, the most global among American constitutionalists; a constitutional imaginer 
extraordinaire—in admiration. 
* Associate Professor, Department of Law and Legal Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa. An 
earlier version of this paper was presented at the symposium Original Constitutionalist: Reconstructing 
Richard Kay’s Scholarship (University of Connecticut School of Law, Sept. 13, 2019) and the 
Scholars’ Workshop on Global Constitutionalism (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, 
Berlin, Germany). 
1 EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN 
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 38 (1st ed. 1988). 
2 SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY DO: ENJOYMENT AS A POLITICAL FACTOR 
249–52 (1991).  
 
1360 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:5 
I 
Imagination is a social practice, a communal activity, an aspect of life, 
a form of work, or an unnamed phenomenon that involves individual 
cognition in ways that remain unspecified. It is a process that occurs in a   
society, to a society; something that is exercised for the sake of a political 
community, or by a community itself. For the most part, its accounts are 
re-interpretations of its existing theories of imagination, affirmations of its 
importance, and meditations on the imagination of others, such as Hobbes, 
Locke, Rousseau, Schmitt, and other canonical constitutional thinkers. 
Amidst the growing number of scholarly works on the phenomenon of 
imagination, one is yet to encounter those that directly confront 
imagination as the quotidian activity of imagining—not imagination as a 
historical phenomenon, but imagination-in-action. Even those that 
explicitly embrace the inevitably imaginative character of theory, and who 
exhort others to exercise their imaginations more freely, rarely seem to 
take their own advice.3 Imagination—like Sartre’s hell—seems to be (for) 
the other people.4   
Like imagination, “constitution” is not only a name for a done deed, an 
artefact, but also for an activity of constituting. If so, what do we imagine 
when we imagine the activity of constituting? Constitution as construction? 
If so, what would that make of constitutional imagination? A subjective 
dimension of the inter-subjective practice that goes under a rather familiar 
name of “social construction”? A simple answer to this question is: not 
really. A more elaborate answer must address a couple of related questions 
                                                                                                                     
3 For a similar point, at a more general level, see EDWARD S. CASEY, IMAGINING: A 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL STUDY 221 (2d ed. 2000) (“It is a revealing fact that some of the very same 
philosophers who publicly denounce imagination make abundant use of imagining in their actual 
practice . . . . The result is a paradoxical pattern of denial-cum-acknowledgment in which an express 
denigration is accompanied by a covert recognition of the special utility of imagination in the very 
process of philosophizing.”). 
4 For imagination as “essential for constitutional thinking,” see Oliviero Angeli, Global 
Constitutionalism and Constitutional Imagination, 6 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 359, 375 (2017). 
For imagination as “harnessed” by contemporary constitutions, see Martin Loughlin, The 
Constitutional Imagination, 78 MOD. L. REV. 1, 4 (2015). See also GÜNTER FRANKENBERG, 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES: BETWEEN MAGIC AND DECEIT 16 (2018) (arguing that 
“comparative constitutional studies . . . should look at the margins, decipher the rhetoric and start 
conversation between centres and peripheries”); Paul Blokker, The Imaginary Constitution of 
Constitutions, 3 SOC. IMAGINARIES 167, 168 (2017) (discussing a sociological approach to 
constitutionalism); Ji í P ibá , Constitutional Imaginaries and Legitimation: On Potentia, Potestas, and 
Auctoritas in Societal Constitutionalism, 45 J.L. & SOC’Y S30, S32 (2018) (arguing that “the theory of 
societal constitutionalism has to focus on the presence of non-political power in societal constitutions 
and its various forms of politicization and authorization”); Robert L. Tsai, Fire, Metaphor, and 
Constitutional Myth-Making, 93 GEO. L.J. 181, 184 (2004) (noting the use of fire-imagery in 
“constitutional myth-making” (emphasis omitted)). For imagination in jurisprudence more broadly, see 
generally STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND (2001). 
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first: what do we mean by construction? Are there acts of imagination that 
cannot be reduced to the acts of construction?  
According to Ian Hacking, “[t]he core idea behind construction, from 
Latin to now, is that of building, of putting together.”5 What is being put 
together is something whose existence is taken for granted, however we 
call it: bricks, elements, parts, components, building-blocks, and so on. 
From that perspective, we constitute constitutions by constructing them 
from a set of generic elements. What they are is a matter of perspective: 
some scholars will focus on constitutional norms, some on institutions, 
some on functional and territorial divisions of power, some on the 
distribution of personal, material, and spatial jurisdiction, and some on 
underlying principles and their “basic structures.”  
Though it is certainly possible to imagine constitutions as (social) 
constructions that consist of pre-existing elements, the choice of these 
elements is a matter of something else: a perspective, an approach, a point 
of view from which we “observe” these, and not those elementary 
building-blocks in our world of constitutions. But why “observe” and not 
observe? The first answer to this question is short and simple: 
observation—as the outcome of observing—depends on the parameters 
that define our specific observation protocols and which cannot be reduced 
to a rather misleading notion of “perspective.”  
II 
A longer and more complicated, if ultimately more illuminating 
answer, starts off with an illustration whose aim is to demonstrate the 
constituent power of our observational frames. Altering their 
circumference defines not only the extent of our observation—that is, how 
far, or how much we “see”—but, more importantly, the character of what 
ends up being observed: what, exactly, we “see.” By way of example, 
consider first the effects of changing the scope of our observational frame 
in a more natural environment—say, in a forest in which, all of a sudden, 
you become aware of a swarming multitude of ants before your feet.  
If you narrowed the circumference of your gaze, you’d naturally be 
forced to focus your attention on individual ants. Seeing a pine needle atop 
of one ant’s back, how would you describe that scene? As the process of 
the transportation of the needle by virtue of a moving ant, or as a situation 
in which a little ant exists as a willful agent, holding, bringing, taking, 
dragging the object in question, and in doing so contributing to the success 
of the overall endeavor?  
In turn, while you might still refer to such ants as attempting, 
persevering, or succeeding, a more panoramic scene would appear if you 
                                                                                                                     
5 IAN HACKING, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? 49 (1999). 
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expanded your circumference. You would start considering how different 
patterns in their movement and interactions give rise to the emerging 
pattern on the ground: a new anthill—the effect of manifold activities that 
can be attributed to no single ant in particular. Or, in more formal terms: 
“the narrowing of the circumference thus encourage[s] . . . the stress upon 
the ‘efficient cause’” 6—it encourages, in other words, the focus on an 
agent that causes the act in question. 
Expanding the circumference, in contrast (looking at the proverbial 
bigger picture) situates that actor’s willful agency within a broader 
landscape of (inter-)action. Within that landscape, the references to that 
agent’s “will” reveal themselves as one of the oblique ways to describe the 
purpose of agency within a broader field of struggle. We see the same logic 
at work behind the vocabularies we use to make sense of some of the most 
violent global phenomena, such as the conflicts over territorial sovereignty. 
We have no qualms about personifying the formal holders of the right to 
self-determination.  
However when we happen to imagine them, we tend to speak of them 
as the peoples that willingly and willfully accept, reject, aspire, struggle, 
fight, decide, or otherwise act like giant humanoid actors. Notice, however, 
that we may only do so if we zoom in on those struggles. That is, if we 
observe them from close up, from close enough to forget, that is, about the 
broader environments in which we’d detect not the acts of will, but rather 
the effects of spatiotemporal reconfiguration that can be attributed to no 
sovereign will in particular.  
The problem with these suggestions is not that they are not intimately 
connected with the practice of imagination, but rather that they still don’t 
say much about the ways one might more deliberately and purposefully 
exercise imagination as the participant in the scholarly practice of 
constitutional theory. In order to do so, it is necessary to begin by making 
three important distinctions: (1) “between process and the product, 
between the way one gets there, and the result,” both of which are alluded 
to by the “-tion”-suffixed verbal nouns such as constitution, or 
imagination;7 (2) between imagination as a purposeful activity and the acts 
of imagining; and (3) between the imagined activities of scholars—from 
those that do not appear as imagined at all (such as theorizing, 
conceptualizing, or defining)—to those, which only seem to make sense if 
we are able to imagine what they involve in action.  
At different levels of abstraction, such activities will typically include: 
(i) delineating, such as drawing a line that separates an inside from an 
outside, trivially, but also in more concrete, and kinetically complex ways; 
                                                                                                                     
6 KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES 79 (1969).  
7 HACKING, supra note 5, at 36.  
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(ii) cutting (e.g. carving out a national homeland from a territory of a 
sovereign state with the help of a foreign or detaching a pre-existing 
territorial unit from a federation); (iii) moving, from one standpoint to 
another; (iv) zooming and focusing, and, at some point something which is 
perhaps most economically described metaphorically; and (v) choosing an 
optical, recording, or some other instrument that will determine the 
outcome of the observer’s observations. 
III 
While the vocabulary of modern constitutionalism constantly reminds 
us of a necessity to cut—to cut off (de-cidere) and cut out (ex-capere)—we 
never really create new “ideas and structures from scratch.”8 In doing so, 
we rarely confront the question of what is constitutionalism, to begin with. 
It could be an ideal (like communism), an era (like nationalism), a system 
(like socialism), a tendency (like majoritarianism), a phenomenon (like 
populism), a state of affairs (like antagonism), an achievement (like 
pluralism), or a logic (like capitalism). In the case with Rick’s 
constitutionalism, it is a general pre-disposition: a risk-averse attitude 
which “prefers the awkwardness of rigidly bound state action to the 
possibility that government will overshoot the mark in dealing with new 
circumstances” and is ready “to concede the costs of suboptimal public 
responses to change as an acceptable price to pay for the security 
obtained.”9  
Rick’s constitutionalism takes for granted the “liberal view” on “the 
optimal conditions for developing human welfare,” which “supposes that 
human thriving is most likely to be obtained in a life that is largely 
self-defined.”10 Though it would be possible to critique this view, for 
ignoring that the questions of “how to live one’s life . . . [have] already 
been answered, implicitly or explicitly, in every social formation . . . 
[including those] that embrace[] the pluralism of forms of life,”11 what’s 
important to notice is something that might otherwise be easy to ignore: 
beyond preventing over-reach, mitigating broadly-defined evils, regulating 
narrowly-defined objects, and restraining other public actions, the basic 
existential function of Rick’s constitution is not to serve the interests of a 
sovereign people as its trans-generational collective author. Rather, it is to 
                                                                                                                     
8 NICO KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST STRUCTURE OF POSTNATIONAL 
LAW 27 (2010). 
9 Richard S. Kay, American Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS 16, 24 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998) (emphasis added). 
10 Richard S. Kay, Constitutional Chrononomy, 13 RATIO JURIS 31, 33 (2000). 
11 RAHEL JAEGGI, Preface, CRITIQUE OF FORMS OF LIFE (Ciaran Cronin Trans., Belknap Press 
2018). 
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make the life of the people it governs—whoever they may happen to be, in 
one way or another—better.   
If so, could we, perhaps, imagine what it looks like? We should be able 
to. Rick’s essays are full of industrial equipment—“explicit machinery for 
periodic constitutional revision,”12 “the machinery for electing and 
convening the convention,”13 “the active machinery of government,”14 
“structural machinery of constitutionalism,”15 “state machinery,”16 the 
“decision-making machinery that claims to represent the consent of the 
human population,”17 the non-existent “machinery for submitting national 
lawmaking to a popular vote,”18 the “institutional machinery constituting 
the Canadian state,”19 and the “old machinery of colonial legal authority.”20 
Not only are constitutions the creatures of our imagination, but we 
construct them, and live ‘under’ them.21 Constitutions are structures which 
exist in 3D!  
Could some such structure be what Rick might have had before his 
eyes when he made an effort to stress that the constitutions which “define[] 
the institutions and procedures required to effect genuine acts of the 
government created” do not simply lay down the law, but that they actually 
“constitute[] in the literal sense?”22 Though intriguing, it is  actually hard 
to imagine that “ordinary or primary” sense of the term “constitution” 
would refer to anything else but some more or less ceremonious 
proclamation that the rules and principles inscribed in the parchment are 
from that moment on “in force” as the supreme law of the land.  
Not only is that idea hard to imagine, but it is quite possible that in 
languages other than English—including my native Serbo-Croatian—the 
only way to make sense of the notion of “constitutions that literally 
constitute” is to invent a new verb on the spot (ustavi koji doslovno 
“ustavljaju?”) which probably wouldn’t make much sense either—at least 
not the one which I manufactured a moment ago—and which reads that 
                                                                                                                     
12 Richard S. Kay, Constituent Authority, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 715, 726 (2011). 
13 Id. at 728.  
14 Richard S. Kay, Democracy, Mixed Government, and Judicial Review, in LAW UNDER A 
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY 199, 223 (Lisa Burton 
Crawford et al. eds., 2019).  
15 Kay, American Constitutionalism, supra note 9, at 16. 
16 Kay, Democracy, Mixed Government, and Judicial Review, supra note 14.  
17 Richard S. Kay, Changing the U.K. Constitution: The Blind Sovereign, in SOVEREIGNTY AND 
THE LAW 98, 113 (Richard Rawlings, Peter Leyland & Alison L. Young eds., 2013).  
18 Kay, Democracy, Mixed Government, and Judicial Review, supra note 14, at 209. 
19 Richard S. Kay, The Secession Reference and the Limits of Law, 10 OTAGO L. REV. 327, 335 
(2003). 
20 Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 12, at 733. 
21 Id. at 743. 
22 Kay, Constitutional Chrononomy, supra note 10, at 32 (emphasis added). 
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“constitution literally block,” or, more archaically, “literally establish a 
dam.”   
IV 
A constitution is an artifice—as is constituent authority. The material 
we have for constructing it may be “malleable,” and though it “may be 
many things,” constituent authority “is not anything we want it to be.”23 
Ultimately, it depends on the “prevailing attitudes” of those on the ground, 
and which ultimately depend on their own “perception” of it.24 In order to 
provide an adequate description of constituent authority it is important to 
consider those attitudes through examination25 of “complicated and 
ill-defined practices” and “processes of constitution-making and 
constitutional application.”26 Which “prevailing attitudes” to consider? 
And “prevailing” where?  
Rick’s answer is that it is “reasonable to assume we are dealing with 
some group of individuals associated with some territory.”27 But why? We 
don’t get an answer to that question because Rick pre-empts it with starting 
that sentence with “although we can imagine other possibilities,” which, on 
first look appears as a concession (true, “we can imagine” constituent 
authority otherwise) but which can also be read as if you don’t think this 
account of constituent authority is reasonable, you are free to imagine 
“other possibilities,” so suit yourself.28 None of this is to say that making 
that assumption is unreasonable—only that to the extent we think that 
making it is reasonable, it is in light of some “other possibilities” that we 
must have already considered—which is to say, imagined. 
 So while it may be reasonable to conclude that “[t]he continuing 
normative force of constitutions” depends on attributing them to the acts of 
will of territorially delineated political communities, that conclusion may 
not be so reasonable if we assumed that a number of those communities 
belong to a federal state, whose integrity they contest, or within a 
supranational organization, as the peoples of its member-states.29 Which 
one to focus on is not a matter of what is reasonable, but of a motivated 
preference, which involves not only the choice of a spatiotemporal frame 
within which the attitudes of those on the ground are to be observed, but 
also those that involve further where to look, how, and in what capacity. If, 
for example, you: 
                                                                                                                     
23 Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 12, at 761. 
24 Id. at 756. 
25 Id. at 720. 
26 Kay, Constitutional Chrononomy, supra note 10, at 32. 
27 Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 12, at 739. 
28 Id. at 738 (emphasis added). 
29 Kay, Constitutional Chrononomy, supra note 10, at 39.  
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imagine you’re a Martian, looking down on Earth, and you 
look into national constitutional courts and you hear what 
they’re saying and then you look into Luxembourg at the 
Court of Justice and you hear what they’re saying . . . you 
can’t make any sense of it, you can’t reconcile it. They all 
think they’re sovereign, they all think they’re supreme.30 
One does not have to imagine being a Martian, or someone who is 
looking at the EU from outer space; one can also choose to approach the 
situation from within one of the jurisdictions on the ground. If that 
jurisdiction is “national”—then that’s that: “national monism is correct.”31 
And vice versa: “[i]f we are within the EU jurisdiction,” then the “EU 
monism is correct.”32 This would still make Rick’s claim true, but only 
relative to the contingent preferences of the one who is doing the 
“considering.”  
At that point, it becomes obvious that what shapes Rick’s, and 
everyone else’s account of constituent authority includes not just the 
objective constraints—which prevent it from being “anything we want it to 
be”—and not just our more or less self-aware attempts to determine “many 
things” that constituent authority could be—but also something, which we 
inevitably do want it to be.33 That does not mean that we have stopped 
observing what is going on the ground, only that the “observed quality . . . 
that enables [persons] to produce [a] . . . constitution” (as Rick defines 
“constituent authority”) will not be independent from mostly unchosen 
ways of looking at things, but many of which are—upon reflection—
eminently under the control of “observer”-theorist.34  
What influences those ways, as we’ve just seen a moment ago, is a 
number of choices each of which could be made differently: a standpoint 
(somewhere from outer space, from which you can gaze both at the 
European Court of Justice in Luxemburg and national apex courts, 
wherever they are), orientation (first toward Luxemburg then toward 
national apex courts) as well as a number of other acts of imagination.  
As an illustration of how constitutional theory looks in practice once 
seen as a mental effort that involves (more or less deliberate) activity of 
imagining, it’s useful to go back to Abbé Sieyès and Carl Schmitt—not 
only because their work, for better or worse, remains critical to 
                                                                                                                     
30 Shavana Musa & Eefje de Volder, Interview with Professor Neil Walker, Global Law: Another 
Case of the Emperor’s Clothes?, 17 TILBURG L. REV. 135, 136–37 (2012). 
31 Pavlos Eleftheriadis, Pluralism and Integrity, 23 RATIO JURIS 365, 373 (2010). 
32 Id. 
33 Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 12, at 761 (emphasis added). 
34 Id. at 720. See also KENDALL L. WALTON, MIMESIS AS MAKE-BELIEVE: ON THE FOUNDATIONS 
OF THE REPRESENTATIONAL ARTS 15 (1990) (“If I find myself musing, spontaneously, about a candy-
striped polar bear jumping over the moon, I may nevertheless realize that I could, if I wanted to, 
imagine instead a polka-dotted grizzly jumping over a star, or that I could stop imagining altogether.”). 
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contemporary constitutional theory—but also because Rick uses them as 
sparring partners in his own work on constituent authority.  
In trying to show what separates them imaginatively, my aim is not to 
take issue with Rick’s overall assessment of either of them, nor with an 
important tension that Rick detected which—far from trivial or 
inconsequential—still remains ignored in recent conversations about 
constituent power:  
The classic invocations of “constituent power” stress that it 
requires no justification, legal or moral. “Every attribute of 
the nation,” said Sieyès, “springs from the simple fact that it 
exists,” and Schmitt said that the will of the “constitution-
making power is existentially present: its power or authority 
lies in its being.”  
This cannot be the whole story.35 
Though what constitutes the “whole story” will always be a matter of 
dispute, Sieyès’s three-part drama begins with a scene in which we 
encounter a group of “isolated individuals” who, in “seeking to unite,” are 
already a “nation.”36 In the second “epoch” (which we’ve reached by 
fast-forwarding to a point in which we encounter an already sizeable 
nation) whose members, wishing to give their union “consistency” begin 
exercising their “constituent power” in “local parishes”—and in the third 
epoch—by sending their delegates to the regional assemblies, who in turn 
send their own to a nation-wide constituent assembly, which ends up 
exercising the “constituent power” which is today subject of so many 
theoretical conversations.37 
All this happens within a compressed time frame with Sieyès 
expanding and refining our gaze each step of the way: from what is 
ostensibly a scene in the state of nature, on to a more panoramic landscape 
that features numerous “parishes,” and finally onto the most-encompassing 
view, which presents us with what is effectively the administrative map of 
actual France—divided into “forty thousand parishes,” no more no less.38 
In contrast, Schmitt presents us with a scene in which “the people” are  
assembled for whatever purpose, to the extent that it does not 
only appear as an organized interest group, for example, 
during street demonstrations and public festivals, in theaters, 
on the running track, or in the stadium, this people engaged 
                                                                                                                     
35 Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 12, at 721 (internal citations omitted). 
36 EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYÈS, What is the Third Estate?, in POLITICAL WRITINGS: INCLUDING 
THE DEBATE BETWEEN SIEYÈS AND TOM PAINE IN 1791, at 134 (Michael Sonenscher ed. & trans., 
2003). 
37 Id. at 136. 
38 Id. at 140. 
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in acclamation is present, and it is, at least potentially, a 
political entity.39 
What we witness, in both cases, are different ways of doing what every 
constitutional theorist must do somehow: turn events and processes into 
figures, which others can more easily get a handle on. What we “observe” 
in both cases, are not simply events or processes, but the recordings of 
events and processes, which either move too fast for us to see the bloody 
history of wars and civil wars that shaped France into the receptacle of one 
nation (as with Sieyès) or which are cut too short for us to “observe” what 
happens next after the revolutionary moment of “acclamation.”40  
What we hope to see next—at least if we sympathize with the specific 
aspirations of the members of this entity—is to “evoke powerful emotions” 
and provoke a “coordinated action that cold-blooded calculation would not 
have produced”—especially when an “initial event is especially vivid and 
information on the true strength of a regime is scarce.”41 Whether this 
“reality simplifying heuristic” indeed has potential to accelerate the turn of 
events, and perhaps even reduce the amount of violence typically involved 
in such events—it will “lead people to overestimate the vulnerability of 
their own authoritarian regimes” and bring conflict to a next phase in 
which it will become more obvious whether the original event triggered a 
revolution that’s coming to its end, or a potentially endless civil war.42  
V 
At this point it is important to notice a fundamental difference between 
this “political entity” and a “political entity” that appears on the pages of 
Schmitt’s Concept of the Political four years later—at a point when he lost 
                                                                                                                     
39 CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 272 (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans., Duke Univ. Press 
2008) (1928). See also Renato Cristi, Carl Schmitt on Sovereignty and Constituent Power, 10 CAN. J.L. 
& JURIS. 189, 198 (1997) (explaining that “Schmitt underscores the foundational nature of constituent 
activity. Constituent power qua sovereign transcends the constitution; the manner of its activity cannot 
be prescribed constitutionally”). For the recent perspectives on constituent power more generally, see 
Martin Loughlin, On Constituent Power, in CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND LIBERALISM 151, 151–53 
(Michael W. Dowdle & Michael A. Wilkinson eds., 2017); Yaniv Roznai, “We the People,” “Oui, the 
People” and the Collective Body: Perceptions of Constituent Power, in COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 295, 295 (Gary Jacobsohn & Miguel Schor eds., 2018) (“[Constituent 
power] is the power to establish the constitutional order of a nation.”); JOEL I. COLÓN-RIOS, WEAK 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND THE QUESTION OF CONSTITUENT POWER 8 
(2012) (defining constituent power “as the power to create a constitution together, with the 
participation of those subject to it”). 
40 EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYÈS, Views of the Executive Means Available to the Representatives of 
France in 1789, in POLITICAL WRITINGS: INCLUDING THE DEBATE BETWEEN SIEYÈS AND TOM PAINE 
IN 1791, at 37 (Michael Sonenscher ed. & trans., 2003). 
41 Henry E. Hale, Regime Change Cascades: What We Have Learned from the 1848 Revolutions 
to the 2011 Arab Uprisings, 16 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 331, 336 (2013). 
42 Id. at 336.  
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interest in a constitutional theory that rests on “abstractions” and 
“normative ideals.”43 Unlike the former, this second “entity” is not an 
ensemble of actors in the plural (the people who are engaged in act of 
acclamation) or an emblematic actor (the people, as potential political 
entities, possess the will for an independent political existence). In contrast 
to the one that appears on the pages of Constitutional Theory and which is 
set on a stage as an ensemble of protagonists who exercise their constituent 
power, the “entity” that appears in The Concept of the Political is an 
ensemble of a different kind: not an ensemble of actors, but an ensemble of 
members.  
Rather than set on a stage as an actor in a scene, this ensemble is 
engineered into theoretical existence. It is a set of elements which satisfy a 
particular membership function, not a concrete manifestation of the 
friend-enemy distinction. Rather than the incarnation of the ontological 
category of the political, Schmitt’s political “entity” is an ensemble of 
those who allow the “entity” to satisfy the following three criteria: (1) to 
embody “the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation”44; (2) to 
be oriented toward the “most extreme possibility”45 of existential conflict 
with an enemy; and (3) to exist as “a totality of men that fights at least 
potentially”46 and stand in opposition to a corresponding totality. Though 
we don’t know how many of those who belong to this entity must 
themselves conform to these criteria we must assume that a preponderant 
majority, if not all of them, will.  
How is this account different from another famous one, of Sieyès, who 
defines the nation (people) as a “body of associates?”47 The traditional 
answer of constitutional theory: Schmitt’s political “entity” evokes an 
ethnocentric conception of a constitutional subject, while Sieyès’s 
conception evokes a civic, aspirational ideal of common political 
community. However, the difference between the two is also a difference 
between two kinds of sets. Sieyès’s “body of associates” is a crisp set, 
whose membership is defined through the application of a binary 
criterion—the “associates” either belong or don’t belong to the “same 
legislature.”48 In contrast, Schmitt’s “entity” is not a crisp, but a fuzzy 
set—a figure that could have been reconfigured had Schmitt decided to 
scan the multiplicity of attitudes on the ground by calibrating the 
measuring protocols of his optical module differently.  
                                                                                                                     
43 See generally CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL (George Schwab & J. Harvey 
Lomax trans., 1996) (1932) (examining the nature of “the political”).  
44 Id. at 26. 
45 Id. at 35. 
46 Id. at 87. 
47 SIEYÈS, What is the Third Estate?, supra note 36, at 97. 
48 Id.   
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What follows from this, at the very minimum, is a very sensible 
question: What do theorists hope to achieve—and for what reasons do they 
think it beneficial to take a very small number of people who may be 
understood as acting jointly, and treat them synecdochally—pars pro toto, 
as the stand-in for all the members of a polity? Rick’s answer: “Sooner or 
later . . . people will ask what it is about the creation of a constitution that 
obliges them to respect it. [Even though] [p]erceptions of the founding 
events . . . are liable to change over time . . . for a constitution to endure 
over decades or centuries, it will be necessary for [a respectful] attitude 
toward the constitution-makers to persist.”49 
However, “a constitution [that could] endure over decades or 
centuries”50 is a rather strange expectation to have. Especially in a world in 
which most constitutions don’t live long enough to reach adolescence (let 
alone senescence), and where those that do, such as the British 
constitution, don’t even know all the names of its many founding step 
fathers.  
The only constitution to expect to live for another two hundred years 
is, of course, the American—and definitely not the Japanese (imposed by 
an occupying power, and dictated personally by Douglas McArthur),51 or 
the  Canadian (flown over from Britain, and delivered by the Queen of 
England, as more or less according to the plans of Pierre Elliott Trudeau),52 
or the Bosnian (extorted from the leaders of the warring parties by Richard 
Holbrooke in Dayton, Ohio).53  
Most constitutions around the world actually die very young—and yet 
somehow manage to fulfill at least some, if not all of their basic duties in 
the nineteen short years they spend on this earth.54 Why add to the stress 
level of the local populations, who in addition to everything else, now need 
to worry about investing extra effort in making something that they 
probably don’t need in the first place: a more durable constitution? How 
likely is it that their allegiance—whatever it is—actually does contribute to 
its success?   
Rick says that the “success of the United States government has been 
substantially established on a wide and deep popular attachment to the 
                                                                                                                     
49 Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 12, at 757.  
50 Id. 
51 Occupation of Japan and the New Constitution, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/american 
experience/features/macarrthur-occupation-japan-and-constitution/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2020). 
52 Canada Act: Canada-United Kingdom [1982], ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/event/Canada-Act (last visited Feb. 17, 2020). 
53 Bill Clinton, Dayton Accords: International Agreement, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/event/Dayton-Accords (last visited Feb. 17, 2020). 
54 ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL 
CONSTITUTIONS 1–2 (2009). 
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Constitution and to the idea of constitutional government in general”55—in 
part due to “a belief that the Constitution does limit governmental action 
and that the courts will, when called on to do so, apply those limitations.”56  
But does such attachment really exist, given the marked absence of 
constitutional representations from American popular culture? The number 
of streets named “Constitution,” or paintings featuring the act of forming 
the Constitution, or local government departments which feature 
“Constitution” in their name, or the amount of public support for its public 
celebration is minuscule in comparison to those featuring other patriotic 
ideals.57  
Given the paucity of the Constitution’s representations in American 
culture—and a particularly lackluster attitude toward the official 
commemorations of its significance—it is fair to ask what Rick means by 
the success of the United States government and whether that success has 
more to do with the actual success that government has had in making a 
material difference in the lives of its citizens, or can be (especially in the 
early days of the Republic) attributed to the Constitution itself. 
Which is to say: the success owed not to “undiscriminating and blind 
worship” of a visible artefact that evokes reverent awe for an event in 
which a sovereign people established a new order of things (as Hannah 
Arendt famously suggested)58 but to a visible improvement—“fields a few 
years ago waste and uncultivated [now] filled with inhabitants and covered 
with harvests, new habitations reared, contentment in every face, [and] 
plenty on every board”—as the “effect [that] was the intent of the 
Constitution,” and a sign that “it has succeeded.”59  
VI 
A Constitution, says Rick, is an “artifice” whose “success . . . depends 
on the ability, at any given time, to posit a narrative about its creation that 
is both politically acceptable and, if not historically accurate, at least 
historically plausible.”60 Like all narratives, foundational narratives are 
                                                                                                                     
55 Kay, American Constitutionalism, supra note 9, at 49. 
56 Id.   
57 See DANIEL LESSARD LEVIN, REPRESENTING POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION IN 
AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE 9 (1999) (describing the “relative scarcity” of the constitutional 
imagery in American political culture).  
58 HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 205 (1963).  
59 MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN 
AMERICAN CULTURE 41 (1986) (quoting a remark made by Congressman Richard Bland Lee in 1794). 
60 Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 12, at 760–61. According to Robert Cover, narrative 
relates “our normative system[s] to our social constructions of reality and to our visions of what the 
world might be.” Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV 4, 10 (1983). 
For a more skeptical view on the role of narrative in constitutional imagination, see EDWARD S. CASEY, 
Imagination, Fantasy, Hallucination, and Memory, in IMAGINATION AND ITS PATHOLOGIES 65, 81 
(James Phillips & James Morley eds., 2003) (“[I]t is very difficult to superimpose a narrative form on 
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multifunctional devices. While they remain instrumental to the attempts to 
justify institutional authority and explain constitutional legitimacy, in 
doing so they also always have the potential to function as coping 
mechanisms, enjoyment catalysts, and distraction devices. 
As coping mechanisms, the task of foundational narratives is not to 
justify and legitimize, but explain and rationalize. As is the case with all 
autobiographical narrations, their task is to reconcile us with our traumatic 
past that continues to reverberate in our frustrating present, or with our 
frustrating present that can be overcome in light of our glorious past. From 
that perspective, foundational narratives are part of an ongoing 
cognitive-behavioral therapy of more or less traumatic political disorders.  
While perhaps put too flippantly, Jean Baudrillard’s insight about what 
is wrong with the obsession of contemporary constitutional theorists with 
narrative and its role in the formation of collective identity points in the 
right direction: “Identity is . . . absurdity. You dream of being yourself 
when you’ve nothing better to do. You dream of that when you’ve lost all 
singularity.”61 More charitably, successful foundational narratives will 
reconcile us with our situation, reduce our political frustrations, and bring 
us together as a people and give us hope, patience, courage, generosity, 
energy, and insight—or even wisdom—individually.  
There is a reverse side to that, though. Rhetorically successful 
narratives will also catalyze, if marginally, the effectiveness of 
constitutional democracy as a regime of affect-management. Here, the task 
of narratives is to maintain the picture of democratic institutions as 
instrumental to the processes of collective self-government, while at the 
same time concealing how they would appear in relief: not as the 
instruments of opinion- and will-formation of a demos (that transform 
individual preferences into collective decisions of a demos), but as the 
instruments of affect-modulation (that, depending on the situation may 
with different degrees of success intensify, focalize, suppress, neutralize, 
divert, disperse, or otherwise organize the flows of eros that have the 
potential to turn demos into an ethnos).  
VII 
Constitutions, Rick also says, are the “creatures of our intelligence and 
imagination,” but “from time to time,” there is some value in reminding 
ourselves, “of the fictions that support [our institutions], and [of] our stake 
                                                                                                                     
what we imagine. For such a form to ‘take,’ a certain continuity in content and manner of presentation 
is required. In the absence of such continuity, isolated episodes may appear, but they will not fit 
together to constitute anything like a story.”). 
61 JEAN BAUDRILLARD, PAROXYSM: INTERVIEWS WITH PHILIPPE PETIT 49 (Chris Turner trans., 
1998).  
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in behavior that conforms to those fictions.”62 Though Rick concludes that 
our “final belief” must be in a fiction,63 in his account of constituent 
authority he ends up producing at least seven different figures of the 
people: 
(1) the people as the “‘imaginary collective body of the 
group’ capable of signifying the assent of the real human 
beings who are to be governed by the constituted 
power”;64 
(2) the people capable of “authentic representation,” and 
having successful “surrogates”;65 
(3) the people as a “society” which has “formed an 
awareness of belonging together that can support 
majority decisions and solidarity efforts”;66 
(4) the people as a (corporate) person, detected on the basis 
of criteria, and capable of acting “with all the attributes 
of personality, conscience and will”;67  
(5) the “people capable of exercising constituent authority” 
but incapable of being defined by a “precise 
algorithm”;68  
(6) the people whose “perfectly unmediated voice” is 
“necessarily a fiction,” and whose will may only have 
infrequent, “crude expressions,” and which can never be 
expressed with “nuance or qualification”;69 and finally  
(7) constituent “people,” as the supplier of the “necessary 
consent of the governed to the law to be made by the 
constituted powers.”70 
These are not the same figures. Still, each of them conforms to the 
ideal of the “political rightness of self-government,”71 not dissimilar from 
Frank Michelman’s definition of “[p]opular political self-government”: a 
government where the people, themselves, “decid[e] . . . the contents . . . of 
                                                                                                                     
62 Kay, American Constitutionalism, supra note 9, at 49.  
63 Id. 
64 Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 12, at 743.  
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 742. 
67 Id. at 743. 
68 Id. at 742. 
69 Id. at 747 (emphasis added). 
70 Id. at 738. 
71 Id.  
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the laws that organize and regulate their political association,”72 where 
governors, govern “in accordance with the interests of the people,” “on 
sufferance of popular majorities,” in conformity with “the electoral and 
representational schemes for toting those majorities,” and “geared to a fair 
reflection of interests in the population”—which, gives us a reason to 
believe that they will “attend decently well to the interests of the governed 
. . . government for the people.”73  
And that, at a minimum, involves a “measure of responsiveness,” but 
that doesn’t tell us whether a “measure of responsiveness” that government 
owes to its citizens involves “continuing responsiveness . . . to [their] 
preferences,”74 nor does it tell us how large or small that measure should 
be, nor what that responsiveness consists of—to begin with. So, it is quite 
possible to consider the same people as theoretically “decisive in 
democratic determinations[,]” but at the same time give “no weight to what 
actual people think in any specific political moment.”75 This is especially 
true if—as Kim Lane Scheppele suggests—the notion that “the present and 
the preferences of actually existing people should have no particular moral 
weight” is “cooked into [the] training” of constitutional theorists.76 
On closer look, the indispensability of popular sovereignty to liberal 
democracy has been far from established in the literature. An eminent 
volume on constitutionalism from the late 1970s, mentions neither popular 
sovereignty, the people, nor the community as concepts,77 which most 
contemporary theorists, preoccupied with the questions of constitutional 
identity, self-constitution, and constituent power, cannot seem to imagine 
as imaginary. Likewise, contributors to a widely regarded volume on 
“constitutionalism in transition” from the 1990s, make no mention of 
popular sovereignty in their discussions of the structure, functions, and 
forms of limited, mixed, republican, and democratic constitutions.78  
                                                                                                                     
72 FRANK I. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY 5–6 (1999). 
73 Id. at 11 (emphasis added). 
74 ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 1 (1971) (emphasis added).  
75 See Kim Lane Scheppele, The Opportunism of Populists and the Defense of Constitutional 
Liberalism, 20 GERMAN L.J. 314, 319 (2019). 
76 Id. 
77 Gordon J. Schochet, Introduction: Constitutionalism, Liberalism, and the Study of Politics, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 5 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1979) (noting in the introduction 
that the understanding of a “constitution” is formed by “a set of formal political institutions rather than 
an ideology”).  
78 CONSTITUTIONALISM IN TRANSFORMATION: EUROPEAN AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
(Richard Bellamy & Dario Castiglione eds., 1996). There are a few exceptions in the volume that did 
mention popular sovereignty. See J.H.H. Weiler, European Neo-Constitutionalism: In Search of 
Foundations for the European Constitutional Order, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN TRANSFORMATION: 
EUROPEAN AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 105, 105 (Richard Bellamy & Dario Castiglione eds., 
1996) (confronting the legitimacy of the European constitution); Ulrich K. Preuß, Two Challenges to 
European Citizenship, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN TRANSFORMATION: EUROPEAN AND THEORETICAL 
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If Bernard Yack is right, the doctrine of popular sovereignty invests 
“final authority in an imagined community”79 whose historical act of will 
set the foundations for the existing constitutional order, but remains 
agnostic on who rules in its name in the meantime.80 While Yack agrees 
that popular sovereignty “promotes a more egalitarian picture of political 
order . . . [and] can easily become the starting point for justifications for 
more democratic forms of government,”81 he also claims that it would be 
“a mistake . . . to identify the modern doctrine of popular sovereignty with 
commitment to democratic forms of government”82—a position similar to 
that of Daniel Lee, who argues that “popular sovereignty has essentially 
nothing to do with democracy.”83 
If so, liberal (constitutional) democracy is not necessarily a popular 
form of government. And vice versa: liberal democracy may be a form of 
popular government even when its constitutive principle appears 
antithetical to the principle of popular sovereignty. Would Rick agree with 
this proposition? Though I am not sure that he would, that conclusion 
could be inferred from Rick’s remarks on the predicament of “unelected 
constitutional courts” in contemporary constitutional democracies.84 These 
“unelected constitutional courts” enjoy “a high regard from the population” 
as the institutions whose authority derives from a popularly-adopted 
constitution, yet are easily seen as “non-democratic” within a broader 
system of government that is essentially “mixed.”85 What can we infer 
from this? At least five things, I think:  
(i) that it is possible for an institution to be both 
“non-democratic” and “popular”; 
(ii) that a “non-democratic” institution can still be 
legitimate if it belongs to a system of government 
which is sufficiently well regarded—which is to say 
“popular”; 
(iii) that “popular” government and “democratic” 
government are not coterminous;  
                                                                                                                     
PERSPECTIVES 122, 122 (Richard Bellamy & Dario Castiglione eds., 1996) (discussing the conflicts 
over self-determination in Central and Eastern Europe). 
79 Bernard Yack, Popular Sovereignty and Nationalism, 29 POL. THEORY 517, 519 (2001). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 518–19.  
82 Id. at 518. 
83 DANIEL LEE, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN EARLY MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 318 
(2015). 
84 Kay, Democracy, Mixed Government, and Judicial Review, supra note 14, at 199. 
85 Id. at 221–22. 
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(iv) that liberal democracy may be both democratic as 
well as popular government even though it doesn’t 
subscribe to the principle of popular sovereignty; and  
(v) that liberal democracy may be a “mixed” form of 
government—that is “popular” because it’s 
democratic and vice versa, or that is “democratic” as 
well as “popular.”  
This is what Rick might have had in mind when he concluded that 
contemporary constitutional democracies still conform to  
[t]he constitutional scheme designed by the American 
founders . . . [who] intended to separate the active machinery 
of government from the choices of the populace, so that the 
‘public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the 
people, [who presumed that such government] will be more 
consonant to the public good then if pronounced by the 
people themselves, convened for the purpose’. But [who] 
also meant to provide machinery that could not long function 
in contradiction with deeply held desires of the population. . . 
.  [On this scheme] it was sufficient that a republican 
government ‘derives all its powers directly or indirectly from 
the great body of the people, and is administered by persons 
holding their offices during pleasure and for a limited period, 
or during good behavior’. All our modern ‘constitutional 
democracies’, even those with constitutional courts that have 
slipped the bonds of the constitutional text, satisfy that 
definition.86  
Theoretically speaking, Rick is probably right. But whether modern 
constitutional democracies satisfy this definition depends on the 
assumption that it is indeed the case that they actually “could not long 
function in contradiction with deeply held desires of the population.”87 
Whether that is, indeed the case, depends not only on one’s sense of what 
counts as “contradiction” in this context, but also on what counts as the 
“desires of the population”—as well as on one’s assumption about how 
long its institutions can go on ignoring them. And that, in turn, depends 
which desires one considers to be typically “deeply held,” and which ones, 
not.88 
                                                                                                                     
86 Id. at 226 (citations omitted). 
87 Id.  
88 Id. If it is indeed true that “democratic decision-making” is “becoming riskier” because of the 
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But there is a practical angle to this entire issue. It is one thing to say 
that all constitutional democracies still, in principle, count as forms of 
government, which are in some broad sense, “of” and “by” the people 
because they still cannot “long function in contradiction with deeply held 
desires of the population.”89 But this still doesn’t settle the issue of whether 
such forms of government ought to count as the governments, which are 
for the people, whose constitution in order to count as “the people’s law . . 
. must meet [the] need” of the people.90  
VIII 
The references to the “people,” (their “will,” “sovereignty,” 
“authority,” and “decision”) and “democracy” muddle the issue. They 
distract us from the connotations of the adjectives “popular” and 
“democratic,” which range is not unlimited, and which are not completely 
dependent on the terms they qualify. Instead, they seem to have a hard 
core, which travels with them wherever they go, and which—in a number 
of instances—prefigures the meaning of those terms, as well as our 
attitudes toward what they signify.  
For instance: the idea that national parliaments tend to be consumed by 
“intemperate passions and . . . fluctuations” (as Alexander Hamilton 
suggested)91 will make far more sense if we imagine a typical national 
parliament as “a popular assembly”92 instead of a democratic legislature—
not just because we’ve replaced a term that primarily connotes a gathering 
(assembly) with one that refers to the more serious business of making 
laws (legislature)—but also because we’ve imagined that body as 
“democratic,” which is to say, a kind of body that tends to “impose 
procedures on [itself] that help to ensure that [its members] act carefully, 
not hastily; wisely, not foolishly.”93 
Though theorists differ in how they see the role of a sovereign people 
in a modern constitutional democracy, most of them don’t really think that 
it was the people which spoke the American constitution into existence—
or which demonstrated its sovereign will by deciding to leave the European 
                                                                                                                     
those “deeply held desires,” and even more so, if they reflect the desires that, in our estimation, deserve 
to be deeply held too. Id. at 206–07, 226. 
89 Id. at 226. 
90 EDWARD S. CORWIN, CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION: THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT, THE POWERS OF CONGRESS, AND THE PRESIDENT’S 
POWER OF REMOVAL 55 (Richard Loss ed., 1981).  
91 Alexander Hamilton, New York Ratifying Convention Remarks (June 24, 1788), 
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92 Id. 
93 Kay, Democracy, Mixed Government, and Judicial Review, supra note 14, at 225. 
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Union,94 or which dethroned Evo Morales in an act of democratic 
revolution.95 
Though hardly enthusiastic about the idea of an actually existing, 
sovereign, and politically-unified political community, many contemporary 
constitutional theorists still refuse to look beyond the horizons of popular 
sovereignty. Rather than explicitly responding to the objections of those 
who see the ideals of popular sovereignty as outdated, counterproductive, 
or dangerous, many—if not most—contemporary constitutionalists simply 
continue as usual. Though well aware of the objections that could be raised 
against the notions of popular sovereignty in theory as well as in practice, 
their unstated response seems to conform to the formula: “I know very 
well, but nevertheless . . . .” 
Among the scholars who’d be inclined to say so, there are those who 
know very well that a constitutional order is not authored by the people, 
but nonetheless believe that the ideals of popular sovereignty manifest 
themselves whenever a mass of citizens takes part in democratic elections, 
overthrows a despotic government in a revolution, or makes a decision in a 
referendum that results in secession.  
Then there are those who encourage others to see the people as the 
author of a constitutional order for the reasons that have nothing to do with 
the ideals of popular sovereignty, and even though they know very well 
that the people never existed and never will—but who nevertheless, when 
the moment comes, cannot resist missing an uprising against a dictator as 
an act of popular revolution, the result of a referendum as the manifestation 
of popular will, or the adoption of a new constitution as an act of  popular 
self-determination.  
And then, finally, there are those who know very well that the people 
don’t exist, that there is no such thing as the sovereignty of the people, but 
who nevertheless defend these conceptions because they have a privileged 
insight into its true significance and its indispensable contribution.  
Which one is Rick Kay—is hard to say. On the one hand, Rick doesn’t 
maintain a critical attitude toward fictions at all times. “We construct rules, 
institutions, relationships, values and then we live in them. The character 
and success of our lives,” he says, “are genuinely determined by those 
creatures of our own intelligence and imagination.”96 At the same time, he 
                                                                                                                     
94 Benjamin Mueller, What is Brexit? And What Happens Next?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/world/europe/what-is-brexit.html (discussing the national 
referendum in which the citizens voted in favor of Britain leaving the European Union).  
95 Ernesto Londoño, Bolivian Leader Evo Morales Steps Down, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/10/world/americas/evo-morales-bolivia.html (stating that Morales 
stepped down from power after violent protests following a disputed election). 
96 Kay, American Constitutionalism, supra note 9, at 49. 
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sides with Wallace Stevens, believing that “[f]inal belief must be in a 
fiction.”97 The fiction of what?—and for what?—remain open questions. 
                                                                                                                     
97 R. D. Ackerman, Believing in Fiction: Wallace Stevens at the Limits of Phenomenology, 3 
PHIL. & LITERATURE 79, 80 (1979). 
